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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY, 
INC., a Minnesota corporation, 
v. 
Plaintiff 
Respondent. 
STATE OF UTAH, LINN C. BAKER, 
in his capacity as Treasurer 
of the State of Utah, and 
RICHARD G. JENSEN, in his 
capacity as auditor of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants 
Appellants. 
CASE NO. 19216 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action for a declaratory judgment 
to determine if certain uncashed money orders issued by Plaintiff 
were subject to the Utah Unclaimed Property Act. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Summary Judgment was entered by the District Court in 
favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on cross motions for 
summary judgment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Travelers Express Company, Inc. ("Travelers") is a 
Minnesota corporation engaged in the business of selling money 
orders throughout the United States. Travelers has been sellir: 
its money orders in Utah, either directly or through its 
predecessor, since 1959. An overwhelming majority of these mer' 
orders have been presented for payment in due course. However, 
some of the money orders have never been cashed, presumably due· 
loss or destruction of the money order, or simple neglect by tr' 
owner. 
In 1957, Utah adopted the Uniform Disposition of 
Unclaimed Property Act (the "Act"), which is set out at UTAH cor: 
ANN. SS 78-44-1, et ~ Under Section 78-44-2, any "sum payarlE 
on a money order is "presumed abandoned" after seven years. 
Generally, abandoned property must be paid over to the State. 
However, the State's rights are only derivative from those oft~ 
owner, and if the owner's rights have been extinguished, then 
there is no "sum payable.• On the understanding that the Stat.ite 
of Limitations barred all claims of the money order purchasers, 
Travelers, at first, did not report these uncashed money orri~" 
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the State. In response to the State's demand, howe~er, Travelers 
filed its initial report on October 31, 1977, under protest, as 
to all sums then held, and brought this suit for refund and 
declaratory judgment. Subsequent reports were filed October 30, 
1978, October 30, 1979, October 30, 1980, October 30, 1981 and 
October 29, 1982 and Travelers paid to the State, under protest, 
the sums reported. Both parties stipulated that Travelers' 
payment of the sums did not constitute a waiver of any rights, 
including any defense to payment based upon any statute of 
limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CREATES A 
VESTED PROPERTY INTEREST THAT CANNOT BE DESTROYED BY 
STATUTE. 
An action against the issuer of a money order to recover 
the amount payable thereon is a contract action based upon the 
issuer's agreement with the purchaser at the time of issue that 
the issuer would pay out the sum received from the purchaser. 
This cause of action accrues when the money order is issued and 
is subject to six year limitations period of UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 78-12-23, which governs any action on a "contract, obligation 
or liability founded upon ar. instrument in writing.• See 54 
~~~~~ Limitation of Actions S 146: Annotation, 71 A.L.R.2d 284: 
Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 
1177, 1212 (1950) (limitations period commences to run upon the 
issuance of a demand instrument.) 
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The expiration of a limitations period on an action 1, 
recover property creates a vested right to the property in the 
holder, and operates to extinguish the right of the original ow,. 
to require payment. See, ~· McGuire v. University of Utah 
Medical Center, 603 P. 2d 786, 780 (Utah 1979) (running of statut, 
of limitations on an action creates a vested right which cannot 
be impaired without denying due process of law); Del Monte 
Corporation v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978) ("if the 
statute has run on a cause of action, so that it is dead, it 
cannot be revived"); Blue Cross of Northern California v~, 
120 Cal. App. 3d 723, 742, 174 Cal. Rptr. 901, 912-13 (1981) 
("the running of the statute of limitations on ~ claim ~efore ~ 
effective date of the UPL [Unclaimed Property Law], as between t> 
holder and the owner remained available as a defense") (emphasis 
supplied); Pacific Northwest Bell Teleehone Co. v. Deeartment of 
~e_venue, 78 Wash. 2d 961, 481 P.2d 556 (1971) (recognizing stat~·. 
of limitations defense to state's claim under its abandoned 
property law.) 
In this case, the period of limitations on a privaLe 
action by the original owner of a money order against Travelers 
is six years. Consequently, the title to any sum payable oy 
Travelers on an unclaimed money order vests in Travelers six yea:-
after the issuance of the money order, and there is no "sum 
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payable" on a money order issued in Utah seven years after 
issuance, which is the time period under the Act when the payable 
sum is "presumed abandoned." 
II. THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE UNDER THE UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT 
ARE DERIVATIVE FROM THE RIGHTS OF THE OWNERS OF ABANDONED 
PROPERTY DUE TO THE CUSTODIAL NATURE OF THE ACT. 
It is well-established that the rights of a state under 
an abandoned property law are derivative from those of the 
original owner of the property. See, ~· Standard Oil Co. v. 
New Jersey, 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950), affirmed, 341 U.S. 428 
(1951); South Carolina Tax Commission v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
~· 266 S.C. 34, 221 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Bank of America v. 
Cranston, 252 Cal. App. 2d 208, 60 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1967); Pacific 
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 70 Wash. 2d 
961, 481 P.2d 556 (1971); Insurance Co. of North Ame~~~ 
Kni9h_!, 8 Ill. App. 3d 871, 291 N.E.2d 40, 44 (1972), cert. 
~is~~ssed, 414 U.S. 804 (1973). Therefore, if, at the time a 
state seeks to take custody of property under an abandoned 
property statute, the true owner of the property no longer would 
have a right to recover it, the state also is barred because under 
the common law, the expiration of a period of limitations on a 
cause of action creates a vested right which cannot be destroyed. 
The conclusion that the effect of the Unclaimed 
Property Act can be superseded by the running of 
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the statute of limitations is consistent with the 
derivative nature of the Uniform Act, discussed 
earlier. Once the statute of limitations 
precludes action by the owner, the State has 
no higher claim to require the fund or other 
property to be handed over to its custody. 
Utah ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, No 
(Utah Sup. Ct. filed June 3, 1983). 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE RUNNING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SUPERSEDES THE EFFECT OF UTAH'S 
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT. 
As indicated in Defendant's brief, both parties have 
stipulated that the only question pending on appeal is whether 
the aforementioned six year statute of limitations precludes tr 
Treasurer from requiring reports and transfer of funds under 
Utah's version of the Unclaimed Property Act. A recent decis:· 
by this Court, rendered subsequent to the filing of Defendant'' 
brief, is dispositive of the question and affirms the District 
Court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Plaint1'.' 
Section 16 of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed 
Property Act treats unclaimed property as being subject to the' 
even though the applicable state statute of limitations has rue 
prior to the date of presumed abandonment. 8 U.L.A. S 16 
commissioners' note (1972). In Utah ex rel. Baker v. 
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that the Utah Legislature deliberately omitted S 16-from the Act 
in order to avoid possible constitutional objections based on the 
statute of limitations. 
Utah did not enact S 16 of the Uniform Act. 
The omission was deliberate. The Bill originally 
introduced in the Legislature embodied the entire 
Uniform Act, but S 16 was subsequently omitted in 
an amendment put forward by the sponsor of the 
Bill. Utah S.B. 77, 32d Leg. Sess., 1957 Senate 
Journal 83, 344-46, 614. The State offers-~ 
explanation or construction of this omission. 
The Cooperative argues that this deliberate 
omission of a provision that would have directed 
that unclaimed property be reported and paid over 
to the State notwithstanding the expiration of a 
period of limitations establishes the legislative 
intent that the running of a statute of 
limitations should supersede the effect of the 
Unclaimed Property Act. For this and the other 
reasons cited below, we agree. 
The legislative history suggests the reason 
for omitting S 16--to avoid doubts about its 
constitutionality as to claims already barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
Utah ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, supra. 
Further support of the position that the six year 
limitation remains operative despite adoption of the Unclaimed 
Property Act is found in the language of certain provisions of the 
Act as promulgated by the Utah Legislature. This Court has 
acknowledged the persuasiveness of such language and concluded 
that it serves to indicate the legislature's intent to allow the 
statute of limitations to supersede the effect of the Act. 
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